

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03
ACDA-10 NSAE-00 PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01
DODE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CCO-00 /063 R

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-----250704Z 032873 /17/73

O R 250156Z JAN 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

USNMR SHAPE

UNCLAS STATE 016138

TOVIP 10 FOR MR. GLITMAN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TOVIP NUMBER OMITTED)

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: NATO

SUBJECT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF NUNN-BARTLETT TRIP TO NATO

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF JAN. 24 PRESS RELEASE FROM OFFICE OF
SENATOR NUNN, SUMMARIZING AND STATING MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
OF HIS AND SENATOR BARTLETT'S REPORT TO THE SENATE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE ENTITLED "NATO AND THE NEW SOVIET
THREAT."

BEGIN TEXT:

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INTRODUCTION

IT IS THE CENTRAL THESIS OF THIS REPORT THAT THE SOVIET
UNION AND ITS EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE RAPIDLY MOVING
TOWARD A DECISIVE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER
NATO. THIS TREND IS THE RESULT OF NATO'S FAILURE SO FAR
TO MODERNIZE AND MAINTAIN ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN
RESPONSE TO THE WARSAW PACT'S BUILDUP AND MODERNIZATION OF
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THE VIABILITY OF CURRENT NATO FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE
AND PERHAPS EVEN NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND
FORWARD DEFENSE IS QUESTIONABLE. THERE NOW EXISTS A

DISPARITY BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE'S DECLARED STRATEGY AND
THE ABILITY OF NATO FORCES TO IMPLEMENT THIS STRATEGY.

TO MEET THE NEW SOVIET THREAT, SUBSTANTIAL ALTERATIONS
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CHANGES ARE MADE, THE ALLIANCE WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY
IMPOTENT AS A VEHICLE FOR THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY OF ITS
MEMBERS.

THE STATE OF ALLIANCE DEFENSES TODAY

NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK CAN BE REGARDED AS LITTLE MORE
THAN A SHAMBLES. AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF EXPANDING SOVIET
NAVAL POWER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, NATO'S MEDITERRANEAN
MEMBERS APPEAR TO BE ABDICATING THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES
UNDER THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.

THE NEW SOVIET THREAT

SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE HAVE UNDERGONE
SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION DURING THE PAST DECADE AND ARE
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NOW BEING QUALITATIVELY IMPROVED. THE SOVIETS HAVE
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WEST GERMANY AN ABILITY TO INITIATE A POTENTIALLY
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WHILE SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE CAN INITIATE A
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A PACT CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH SUCH

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AN ATTACK TO DIVIDE THE ALLIES, PARTICULARLY IF THE ATTACK WERE LAUNCHED AGAINST ONE MEMBER RATHER THAN AGAINST THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. FOR NATO, THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SHARPLY DECREASED WARNING TIME ARE PROFOUND. THEY CALL INTO QUESTION WHETHER NATO'S PRESENT CONVENTIONAL FORCE POSTURE IS ADEQUATE TO MEET THE NEW THREAT.

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MAJOR WARSAW PACT AGGRESSION PRECEDED BY PERHAPS JUST A FEW DAYS' WARNING WOULD EXPLOIT CERTAIN POLITICAL AND MILITARY WEAKNESSES WHICH CONTINUE TO PLAGUE NATO. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS HARD TO ENTERTAIN THE NOTION THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATIONS IN THE CHARACTER OF SOVIET FORCE POSTURE IN EASTERN EUROPE REGISTERED DURING THE PAST EIGHT YEARS HAVE BEEN ANYTHING BUT DELIBERATE.

IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY

HOWEVER, NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES HAVE NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY CHANGED TO MEET A SHIFTING SOVIET CONVENTIONAL THREAT. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE IS NOT THE STATED PRINCIPLES OF NATO STRATEGY, BUT RATHER THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE TO IMPLEMENT THEM. IN OUR VIEW, THERE IS A GRAVE DISPARITY BETWEEN EXPRESSED NATO STRATEGY ON THE ONE HAND, AND NATO FORCE POSTURE ON THE OTHER.

PROBLEMS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENSE

FIRST, INHERENT IN THE CONCEPT OF THE "COVERING FORCE" OPERATION IS AN AT LEAST TEMPORARY LOSS OF SOME GERMAN TERRITORY. CURRENTLY, THIS RISK IS COMPOUNDED BY DEFICIENCIES IN THE POSTURE OF NATO'S DEPLOYED FORCES WHICH THREATEN BOTH THE ABILITY OF THE COVERING FORCE TO PROVIDE THE TIME NEEDED TO MOUNT A MAIN DEFENSE, AND THE CAPACITY OF THE COVERING FORCE TO HOLD FORWARD POSITIONS. TOGETHER, THESE CONDITIONS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF TERRITORY SO SUBSTANTIAL AS TO DEMORALIZE GERMANY'S CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITY. THIS COULD RESULT IN EARLY LOSS OF NATO'S MOST POWERFUL CONTINENTAL MEMBER.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE
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MAY NOW CREDIBLY DETER A NATO FIRST USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE BULK OF SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE MORE DESTRUCTIVE AND LONGER-RANGED THAN NATO'S. THEY COULD BE USED AGAINST MOST LARGE EUROPEAN CITIES. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE, TO A MUCH LARGER EXTENT THAN NATO, ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE AND FIGHT ON A NUCLEAR BATTLEFIELD.

IN SHARP CONTRAST, THE COMPARITIVELY SHORT REACH AND LOW YIELD OF MOST OF NATO'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD RESTRICT THEIR EMPLOYMENT PRIMARILY TO NATO TERRITORY, PARTICULARLY IF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES HAD BEEN DRIVEN DEEP INTO THE REAR OF GERMANY. AS ONE KNOWLEDGEABLE GERMAN RECENTLY REMARKED, "DURING THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS NATO HAS PLAYED FIVE WAR GAMES, AND MY COUNTRY HAS BEEN 'DEFENDED' FIVE TIMES AND DESTROYED FIVE TIMES."

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

DECISIONMAKING IN CRISIS

THE PRESENT FORMAL STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL DECISIONMAKING WITHIN NATO IS SO COMPLEX AND CUMBERSOME THAT IT RAISES THE CATASTROPHIC PROSPECT OF HOSTILITIES PRECEDING EVEN A NATO DECISION TO MOBILIZE. THIS COMPLICATED PROCEDURE NOT ONLY LENGTHENS THE DECISION PROCESS BUT ALSO RISKS DISJOINTED MOBILIZATION.

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THE CURRENT MEANS OF MUSTERING ADEQUATE POLITICAL AUTHORITY FOR COMPREHENSIVE MILITARY MOBILIZATION MAY HAVE BEEN TOLERABLE AT A TIME WHEN NATO COULD JUSTIFIABLY COUNT UPON WEEKS IF NOT MONTHS OF MILITARY WARNING. THEY ARE CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE AGAINST THE THREAT OF UNEXPECTED ATTACK.

FIREPOWER AND READINESS

ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY IMPLICATION FOR NATO OF DECREASED WARNING TIME IS THE WOEFUL INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT LEVEL OF FIREPOWER READILY AVAILABLE TO NATO FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN AUTHORIZED AND ACTUAL LEVELS OF EQUIPMENT MAINTAINED IN

US WAR RESERVE AND PREPOSITIONED STOCKS IS NOTHING SHORT OF A DISGRACE.

IN THIS REGARD, THE PLIGHT OF THE US ARMY, EUROPE IS ESPECIALLY ILLUSTRATIVE. USAREUR TODAY IS SHORT OF ITS

AUTHORIZED AMMUNITION, OF WHICH A SUBSTANTIAL PERCENTAGE IS STORED AT A FEW VULNERABLE LOCATIONS WEST OF THE RHINE. HOWEVER, PURSUANT TO A RECENT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELY RATES OF AMMUNITION CONSUMPTION IN A HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT IN EUROPE, USAREUR'S AUTHORIZATION HAS BEEN DRAMATICALLY EXPANDED. THEREFORE, IF DOD'S NEW PROJECTIONS ARE CORRECT, USAREUR NOW HAS ON HAND BUT A FRACTION OF THE AMMUNITION IT WILL NEED DURING THE FIRST THIRTY DAYS OF WAR.

THE SEPARATION OF MANY USAREUR COMBAT FORMATIONS FROM IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO THEIR AMMUNITION; THE CONCENTRATION OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITES IN A MANNER WHICH REPRESENTS A STANDING TEMPTATION TO A PREEMPTIVE SOVIET AIR ATTACK; AND THE DISPOSITION OF MUCH OF USAREUR'S AMMUNITION WEST UNCLASSIFIED

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OF THE RHINE (INCLUDING ENGLAND) ALL COMBINE TO RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT USAREUR'S TRUE READINESS FOR COMBAT.

THE STATE OF USAREUR'S WAR RESERVE AND PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT IS APPALLING.

THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THESE SHORTFALLS IS A COMPARATIVELY LOW PRODUCTION BASE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR MANY ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT COUPLED WITH TRANSFERS AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THESE ACTIONS APPEAR TO PLACE A HIGHER PRIORITY UPON EQUIPPING THE FORCES OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAN OUR OWN. THE PRESENT SHORTAGES IN STOCKS OF SUCH HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS AS IMPROVED HAWK AIR DEFENSE MISSILES, AIM-7 AND AIM-9 AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, AND TOW AND DRAGON ANTI-TANK MISSILES COULD BE ELIMINATED WITH A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THESE WEAPONS THE UNITED STATES HAS RECENTLY SOLD (OR UNDERTAKEN TO SELL) TO A HANDFUL OF MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. IN SOME CASES, EQUIPMENT ALREADY AUTHORIZED BY THE CONGRESS FOR THE ARMY OR THE AIR FORCE HAS BEEN ABRUPTLY SIPHONED OFF THE PRODUCTION LINE BY ONE FOREIGN MILITARY SALE OR ANOTHER DEEMED "CRITICAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST." WE WONDER WHAT NATIONAL INTEREST COULD BE MORE CRITICAL THAN THAT OF SUPPLYING US FIGHTING MEN WITH EQUIPMENT SUFFICIENT TO SURVIVE ON THE BATTLEFIELD. WE WONDER WHO HAS HIGHER CLAIM ON AMERICA'S ARSENAL, OUR OWN FORCES OR THOSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST?

WE VISITED A POMCUS SITE WHERE, FOR EXAMPLE, ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES WERE STORED IN OPEN FIELDS COMPLETELY EXPOSED TO THE ELEMENTS, WHILE SUCH NON-ESSENTIAL ITEMS AS TENT PEGS, TENTS, GARBAGE CANS, AND FIELD KITCHENS WERE NEATLY TUCKED AWAY IN CLIMATE CONTROLLED SHELTERS.

ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY
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NATO'S ALL TOO-OFTEN CASUAL CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF ITS PREPONDERANCE OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS TO OFFSET THE PACT'S ADVANTAGE IN ARMOR MAY BE UNJUSTIFIED.

AIR DEFENSE

GROUND AIR DEFENSES ARE PARTICULARLY THIN IN THE CENTAG AREA, AND MUCH OF THE GREAT US LOGISTICS INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTHWEST GERMANY, SUCH AS THE MAMMOTH KAISERSLAUTERN ARMY DEPOT, IS POORLY DEFENDED.

A MAJOR DEFICIENCY IN NATO'S GROUND AIR DEFENSE IS A CRUCIAL SHORTAGE OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. ONE EXAMPLE WILL SUFFICE. ACCORDING TO USAREUR AUTHORITIES, THE "BASIC LOAD" OF IMPROVED HAWK MISSILES FOR US HAWK BATTERIES ASSIGNED TO THE DEFENSE OF THE FIFTH AND SEVENTH US CORPS AREAS IS TODAY ADEQUATE TO SUSTAIN COMBAT AGAINST A HIGH-INTENSITY PACT AIR THREAT FOR ONLY A FEW DAYS, AFTER WHICH THE BATTERIES WOULD BE COMPELLED TO DRAW UPON WAR RESERVE STOCKS. YET, HAWK MISSILES WITHHELD IN WAR RESERVE REPRESENT ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE LEVEL AUTHORIZED, AND MOST ARE OLDER, UNIMPROVED HAWKS. AS OF THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1976, THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM HAD SOLD OR HAD CONTRACTED TO SELL OVER 2,000 HAWKS - MOST OF THEM IMPROVED - TO IRAN, ISRAEL, AND JORDAN ALONE.

TASKS BEFORE THE ALLIANCE

IN LIEU OF ELIMINATING THE THREAT OF DECREASED WARNING THROUGH NEGOTIATION, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT NATO ALTER ITS OWN CONVENTIONAL FORCE POSTURE TO OFFSET THE MILITARY BENEFITS THE PACT NOW ENJOYS AS A RESULT OF DECREASED WARNING.

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POLITICAL TASKS

THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW SOVIET CONVEN-

TIONAL THREAT. ADDITIONALLY, TOP PRIORITY ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DEVELOPING WARSAW PACT MOBILIZATION. WE RECOMMEND THAT A CONFERENCE OF KEY NATO MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS BE CONVENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY THE STEPS NEEDED TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE.

FIRST, CURRENT US FORCE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AS TO THE

PRIOR WARNING TIME AND LIKELY DURATION OF A FUTURE CONFLICT IN EUROPE MUST BE REVISED.

SECOND, CURRENT POSTURAL DEFICIENCIES WHICH THREATEN NATO'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT A SUCCESSFUL FORWARD DEFENSE SHOULD BE CORRECTED WITH THE AIM OF PERMITTING THE ALLIANCE TO WAGE THE MAIN DEFENSE BATTLE CLOSE TO THE INTER-GERMAN BORDER.

THIRD, A QUANTUM JUMP IS NEEDED IN NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FIREPOWER. THE FULFILLMENT OF THESE SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES FOR US FORCES SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO FALL VICTIM TO COMMERCIAL OR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES. THE LIVES OF AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN MUST TAKE PRECEDENCE.

IN THE LONG TERM, THE QUANTUM JUMP IN NATO FIREPOWER NECESSARY TO COUNTER THE NEW SOVIET THREAT CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY BY ACCELERATED EXPLOITATION OF ONGOING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN MUNITIONS, AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS. REPRESENTATIVE OF THESE ADVANCES ARE CANNON-LAUNCHED GUIDED PROJECTILES, AIR- AND ARTILLERY-DELIVERED MINES, LASER-GUIDED WEAPONS, AND TACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. THE NEW

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POTENTIAL OF MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS ALSO SHOULD BE EXPLORED.

FOURTH, THE READINESS FOR IMMEDIATE COMBAT OF DEPLOYED US AND ALLIED FORCES MUST BE IMPROVED.

FIFTH, NATO'S AIR DEFENSES MUST BE TRANSFORMED INTO A CAPABILITY TO INFILCT UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES UPON INTRUDING SOVIET TACTICAL AIR FORCES.

SIXTH, THE ALLIANCE'S PRESENT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS'CAPABILITY MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY ENHANCED TO ACCOMMODATE THE DEMANDS OF THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD.

SEVENTH, THE PACE AT WHICH US AND BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTRAL REGION MUST BE HASTENED.

FINALLY, INTEROPERABILITY OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT WITHIN
THE ALLIANCE MUST BE RELENTLESSLY PURSUED.

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ORIGIN EUR-02

INFO OCT-01 AS-01 SS-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 ISO-00 /005 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/RPM:WROBINSON

APPROVED BY: EUR:AHUGHES

S/S:SGOLDSMITH

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

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UNCLAS STATE 016138

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (INCORRECT TOVIP NUMBER)

FOL RPT STATE 016138 SENT ACTION BONN NATO INFO ALL NATO
CAPITALS USNMR SHAPE 25 JAN QUOTE

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WHILE SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE CAN INITIATE A CONFLICT FROM A STANDING START, NATO FORCES CONTINUE TO REQUIRE WARNING TIME OF A DURATION SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT THE ALLIANCE TO MOBILIZE AND DEPLOY TO THE CENTER OF CONFLICT ITS ULTIMATELY GREATER BUT TYPICALLY LESS READY AND POORLY DEPLOYED FORCES. AS THE WARSAW PACT CAPABILITY TO ATTACK FROM A STANDING START GROWS RELATIVE TO NATO'S DEFENSIVE CAPACITY, SO DOES THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE WARSAW PACT WOULD ALREADY BE ON THE RHINE WHEN THE NATO DECISION IS MADE TO USE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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OF THE RHINE (INCLUDING ENGLAND) ALL COMBINE TO RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT USAREUR'S TRUE READINESS FOR COMBAT.

THE STATE OF USAREUR'S WAR RESERVE AND PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT IS APPALLING.

THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THESE SHORTFALLS IS A COMPARATIVELY LOW PRODUCTION BASE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR MANY ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT COUPLED WITH TRANSFERS AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THESE ACTIONS APPEAR TO PLACE A HIGHER PRIORITY UPON EQUIPPING THE FORCES OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAN OUR OWN. THE PRESENT SHORTAGES IN STOCKS OF SUCH HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS AS IMPROVED HAWK AIR DEFENSE MISSILES, AIM-7 AND AIM-9 AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, AND TOW AND DRAGON ANTI-TANK MISSILES COULD BE ELIMINATED WITH A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THESE WEAPONS THE UNITED STATES HAS RECENTLY SOLD (OR UNDERTAKEN TO SELL) TO A HANDFUL OF MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. IN SOME CASES, EQUIPMENT ALREADY AUTHORIZED BY THE CONGRESS FOR THE ARMY OR THE AIR FORCE HAS BEEN ABRUPTLY SIPHONED OFF THE PRODUCTION LINE BY ONE FOREIGN MILITARY SALE OR ANOTHER DEEMED "CRITICAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST." WE WONDER

WHAT NATIONAL INTEREST COULD BE MORE CRITICAL THAN
THAT OF SUPPLYING US FIGHTING MEN WITH EQUIPMENT
SUFFICIENT TO SURVIVE ON THE BATTLEFIELD. WE WONDER WHO
HAS HIGHER CLAIM ON AMERICA'S ARSENAL, OUR OWN FORCES
OR THOSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST?

WE VISITED A POMCUS SITE WHERE, FOR EXAMPLE, ARMORED
FIGHTING VEHICLES WERE STORED IN OPEN FIELDS COMPLETELY
EXPOSED TO THE ELEMENTS, WHILE SUCH NON-ESSENTIAL ITEMS
AS TENT PEGS, TENTS, GARBAGE CANS, AND FIELD KITCHENS WERE
NEATLY TUCKED AWAY IN CLIMATE CONTROLLED SHELTERS.

ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY
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NATO'S ALL TOO-OFTEN CASUAL CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY
OF ITS PREPONDERANCE OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS TO OFFSET
THE PACT'S ADVANTAGE IN ARMOR MAY BE UNJUSTIFIED.

AIR DEFENSE

GROUND AIR DEFENSES ARE PARTICULARLY THIN IN THE CENTAG
AREA, AND MUCH OF THE GREAT US LOGISTICS INFRASTRUCTURE
IN SOUTHWEST GERMANY, SUCH AS THE MAMMOTH KAISERSLAUTERN
ARMY DEPOT, IS POORLY DEFENDED.

A MAJOR DEFICIENCY IN NATO'S GROUND AIR DEFENSE IS A
CRUCIAL SHORTAGE OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. ONE
EXAMPLE WILL SUFFICE. ACCORDING TO USAREUR AUTHORITIES,
THE "BASIC LOAD" OF IMPROVED HAWK MISSILES FOR US
HAWK BATTERIES ASSIGNED TO THE DEFENSE OF THE FIFTH
AND SEVENTH US CORPS AREAS IS TODAY ADEQUATE TO SUSTAIN
COMBAT AGAINST A HIGH-INTENSITY PACT AIR THREAT FOR
ONLY A FEW DAYS, AFTER WHICH THE BATTERIES WOULD BE
COMPELLED TO DRAW UPON WAR RESERVE STOCKS. YET, HAWK
MISSILES WITHHELD IN WAR RESERVE REPRESENT ONLY A
SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE LEVEL AUTHORIZED, AND MOST ARE
OLDER, UNIMPROVED HAWKS. AS OF THE THIRD QUARTER
OF 1976, THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE FOREIGN MILITARY
SALES PROGRAM HAD SOLD OR HAD CONTRACTED TO SELL OVER
2,000 HAWKS - MOST OF THEM IMPROVED - TO IRAN, ISRAEL,
AND JORDAN ALONE.

TASKS BEFORE THE ALLIANCE

IN LIEU OF ELIMINATING THE THREAT OF DECREASED WARNING
THROUGH NEGOTIATION, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT NATO ALTER
ITS OWN CONVENTIONAL FORCE POSTURE TO OFFSET THE
MILITARY BENEFITS THE PACT NOW ENJOYS AS A RESULT OF
DECREASED WARNING.

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POLITICAL TASKS

THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW SOVIET CONVENTIONAL THREAT. ADDITIONALLY, TOP PRIORITY ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DEVELOPING WARSAW PACT MOBILIZATION. WE RECOMMEND THAT A CONFERENCE OF KEY NATO MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS BE CONVENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY THE STEPS NEEDED TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE.

FIRST, CURRENT US FORCE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AS TO THE

PRIOR WARNING TIME AND LIKELY DURATION OF A FUTURE CONFLICT IN EUROPE MUST BE REVISED.

SECOND, CURRENT POSTURAL DEFICIENCIES WHICH THREATEN NATO'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT A SUCCESSFUL FORWARD DEFENSE SHOULD BE CORRECTED WITH THE AIM OF PERMITTING THE ALLIANCE TO WAGE THE MAIN DEFENSE BATTLE CLOSE TO THE INTER-GERMAN BORDER.

THIRD, A QUANTUM JUMP IS NEEDED IN NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FIREPOWER. THE FULFILLMENT OF THESE SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES FOR US FORCES SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO FALL VICTIM TO COMMERCIAL OR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES. THE LIVES OF AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN MUST TAKE PRECEDENCE.

IN THE LONG TERM, THE QUANTUM JUMP IN NATO FIREPOWER NECESSARY TO COUNTER THE NEW SOVIET THREAT CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY BY ACCELERATED EXPLOITATION OF ONGOING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN MUNITIONS, AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS. REPRESENTATIVE OF THESE ADVANCES ARE CANNON-LAUNCHED GUIDED PROJECTILES, AIR- AND ARTILLERY-DELIVERED MINES, LASER-GUIDED WEAPONS, AND TACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. THE NEW UNCLASSIFIED

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POTENTIAL OF MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS ALSO SHOULD BE EXPLORED.

FOURTH, THE READINESS FOR IMMEDIATE COMBAT OF DEPLOYED US AND ALLIED FORCES MUST BE IMPROVED.

FIFTH, NATO'S AIR DEFENSES MUST BE TRANSFORMED INTO A CAPABILITY TO INFILCT UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES UPON INTRUDING SOVIET TACTICAL AIR FORCES.

SIXTH, THE ALLIANCE'S PRESENT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS'CAPABILITY MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY ENHANCED TO ACCOMMODATE THE DEMANDS OF THE MODERN

BATTLEFIELD.

SEVENTH, THE PACE AT WHICH US AND BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS
CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTRAL REGION MUST BE
HASTENED.

FINALLY, INTEROPERABILITY OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT WITHIN
THE ALLIANCE MUST BE RELENTLESSLY PURSUED.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, COMMUNISM, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MEETING REPORTS, US CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS, THREATS, TOVIP, REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS, PRESS RELEASES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 25-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decapton Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decapton Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE016138
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/RPM:WTROBINSON
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770044-0761, D770026-0044
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770193/baaaevcy.tel
Line Count: 770
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: b29784de-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 15
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14-Sep-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3681758
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF NUNN-BARTLETT TRIP TO NATO
TAGS: PFOR, OREP, GE, XG, US, NATO, (NUNN, SAM), (BARTLETT, DEWEY F), (NUNN, SAMUEL A)
To: BONN NATO MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/b29784de-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009